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Abstract
The Industrial Revolution is often characterized as the culmination of a process of
commercialisation; however, the precise nature of such a link remains unclear. This
paper models and analyses one such link: the impact of a higher degree of anonymity
of market transactions on relative factor prices. Commercialisation raises wages as
impersonal labour market transactions replace personalized customary relations. This
leads, in equilibrium, to higher real wages to prevent shirking. To the extent that
capital and labor are (imperfect) substitutes, the resulting shift in relative factor
prices leads to the adoption of a more capital-intensive production technology which,
in turn, results in a faster rate of technological progress via enhanced learning by
doing. We provide evidence using European historical data that England was among
the most urbanized and the highest wage countries at the onset of the industrial
revolution.
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1 Introduction
A number of recent studies have pointed to the emergence of northwest Europe as a high
wage economy during the early modern period, between the sixteenth and eighteenth cen-
turies, with Britain overtaking the Netherlands to become the highest wage economy in
Europe (van Zanden, 1999; Allen, 2001; Broadberry and Gupta, 2006), at the same time
Britain was among the most urbanized countries in the world, in the rst half of eighteenth
century, at the onset of the industrial revolution (Malanima 2009).
Since one of the key features of the Industrial Revolution was the development of labour
saving technology in Britain, it is natural to link the Industrial Revolution to these prior de-
velopments in factor prices and the global commercial environment in which they emerged
(Broadberry and Gupta, 2009; Allen, 2009). Indeed, a long tradition in economic history
links the transition to modern economic growth to the widespread commercialisation of
Britain and other parts of northwest Europe between the late medieval period and the
Industrial Revolution (Toynbee, 1890; Polanyi, 1944; Britnell and Campbell, 1995). How-
ever the precise nature of the links between the Commercial Revolution and the Industrial
Revolution has remained unclear.
The denition of commercialization used in this paper means more than simply an in-
crease in the proportion of output passing through the market (Britnell and Campbell, 1995:
1). Commercial development is characterized by a dramatic change in the informational
structure among economic agents as already emphasized in the theoretical literature by
Banerjee and Newman (1998). In particular in this paper we are interested in the growing
reliance on anonymous, impersonal relations, as against personalised customary relations,
in labour markets following the commercial revolution. Our starting point is Greif (1994)
who established an endogenous link between anonymous markets, trading relationships and
prices taking as given the level of technology. The contribution of our paper is to establish
the link between the degree of anonymity in labour markets and both capital accumulation
and the evolution of technology, via the e¤ect of relative prices.
In this paper we consider a model of endogenous growth via learning by doing with a
labor market characterized by incomplete information, where agentsincentives to supply
e¤ort are endogenously determined by the prevailing degree of anonymity and wages. We
distinguish between the probability that shirking is detected (as in a model of e¢ ciency
wages (Shapiro and Stiglitzs (1984))) and the probability that a shirking worker who
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has been red will be hired again in the future (along the lines of Greif (1994)). Our
model thus combines elements of e¢ ciency wages, learning-by-doing and endogenous growth
(Hicks, 1932; Arrow, 1962; Romer, 1986) and the institutional enforcement of labour market
discipline based on Greif (1994). At the same time, our model is able to deliver a simple
closed form solution under the assumption of perfect factor substitutability. Nevertheless,
we show the key results to be robus to the relaxation of this assumption with the more
realistic assumption of imperfect substitutability.
Our analysis shows, rst, that the growing commercialisation of the late medieval and
early modern periods led to higher wages as the greater anonymity of market relations
replaced customary relations in the allocation of labour. Note that this e¢ ciency wage
argument avoids the objection sometimes levelled at the literature on induced innovation
that high wages do not reect high labour costs because the labour is also highly productive.
E¢ ciency wages imply higher wages in anonymous commercialized factor markets to induce
the same e¤ort as achieved in more personalized customary relationships backed up by close
supervision. Second, we show that the resulting rise in the wage/cost of capital ratio led
to the adoption of a more capital-intensive technology. Third, this led to a faster rate of
technological progress through greater learning by doing on the capital intensive production
technology.
Viewed from the perspective of Greif (1994), commercialisation can be interpreted as a
switch in the rules of the gamedue to institutional or cultural changes, portrayed in Greif
by the distinction between Genoese and Maghribi traders. However, it is worth noting that
our model is consistent with a more continuous notion of commercialization that entails a
more gradual process of unication of distinct markets, perhaps due to decreasing costs of
trade, that dilutes the bonds of customary labour market relationships between employers
and workers.
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, we present a literature review. Section 3
presents a theoretical model to establish the links between commercialisation and techno-
logical progress. We rst present the model under the assumption that capital and labor
are perfect substitutes; we then show that all results holds more generally when produc-
tion factors are imperfect substitutes. Section 4 then provides an analytic narrative and
a simple econometric exercise, using data relative to the historical transition to modern
economic growth in northwest Europe, in which the Commercial Revolution of the early
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modern period is linked to the Industrial Revolution via its e¤ects on factor prices. Section
5 concludes. Proofs are contained in the Appendix.
2 Related literature
The approach taken here draws on ideas which have been used in the literature on the
importance of high wages in stimulating the innovations of the Second Industrial Revolu-
tion in late nineteenth century America (Rothbarth, 1946; Habakkuk, 1962; David, 1975;
Broadberry, 1997).1 Until recently, there has been a reluctance to cast Britain in the role
of a high wage producer at the time of the Industrial Revolution, since the vast literature
on the standard of living debate emphasized the slowness of real wages to rise. However,
recent work has emphasized international comparisons of the level of real wages and other
factor prices, pointing clearly to Britains unusual combination of factor prices (Allen, 2001;
2009; Broadberry and Gupta, 2006; 2009). This is important not only in explaining the
adoption of modern technology, but also its non-adoption in other countries with di¤erent
factor prices, a point emphasized in the theoretical literature by Zeira (1998) and in the
historical literature by Broadberry and Gupta (2009), Allen, (2009) and Fremdling (2000).
The current paper suggests a link between the two main strands of the macro-development
literature: the institutional approach (e.g. North, 1990; Greif, 2004; 2006; Acemoglu and
Robinson, 2006) and unied growth theory (e.g. Galor and Weil, 1999; 2000; Galor and
Moav, 2000; Hansen and Prescott 2002; Doepke, 2004; Galor, 2005; Cervellati and Sunde,
2005, Madsen, Ang and Banerjee, 2010). The institutional approach emphasizes the im-
portance of trade and commercial development, which are supported by an appropriate
institutional framework, while unied growth theory links technological progress to wages
via an emphasis on human capital, with families choosing to have fewer but more highly
educated children as technology becomes more complex. Our approach sees the two the-
oretical frameworks as complementary: establishing the right institutional framework to
encourage the development of trade leads to higher wages, which then has the e¤ects on
technology traced out in unied growth models Of course this does not preclude the op-
eration of the Malthusian links between wages and population stressed in unied growth
1See Acemoglu (2009) for a formal treatment of the link between labor scarcity and the rate of techno-
logical progress.
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theory.
Furthermore, within the institutional approach, our paper provides a link between com-
mercial development and economic growth that is complementary to the links suggested by
Acemoglu et. al. (2005) and by Galor and Mountford (2006). Acemoglu et. al. focus on
the impact of Atlantic trade on institutions, with growing trade strengthening the position
of merchants in northwest Europe and enabling them to impose e¤ective constraints on the
executive, hence less extractive institutions. Galor and Mountford (2006) show that trade
might have generated a demographic boom in non industrial countries, specialized in the
production of unskilled-labor-intensive goods, hence fostering the process of divergence.
Our approach focuses on an alternative link between trade and growth, with increasing
commercialisation a¤ecting factor prices, choice of technology and the rate of technological
progress.
Our setting is also consistent with the idea that capital was an important engine of
growth along the process of development (Galor and Moav 2004), since we emphasize the
e¤ect of high wages on the capital intensity of production and the subsequent rate of
technological progress. Along similar lines Voigtländer and Voth (2010) emphasize the
importance of the e¤ect of growing capital inputs on TFP increases for the rst phase of
industrialization.2
3 The model
In this section, we introduce our concept of anonymity and endogenous technological
progress via learning by doing. We show that a higher degree of anonymity, arguably
generated by the commercial revolution, made more di¢ cult monitoring workers and led to
an increase in wages and subsequently to more capital intensive production. This process
eventually led to a technological increase in labour e¢ ciency that we characterize as the
industrial revolution.
2And it is not inconsistent with the contributions investigating the importance of the Agrarian sector
on the economic divergence like Galor, Moav and Vollrath (2004) and Vollrath (2011).
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3.1 Workers
Time periods are indexed by t, t = 0; 1; 2; :::. There is a mass N of identical risk averse
workers. There is a probability d that at each time t, the worker dies or permanently retires
from working. Since the number of workers is xed at each period, there are dN new workers
in the economy so that the labor supply is always constant. Workers have an inter temporal
discount factor which, for notational simplicity, we multiply by the probability of surviving
next period, (1  d); and dene the resulting product as  < 1:
At any period t, each worker can be either employed or unemployed and is endowed
with a xed amount of e¤ort that can be costlessy provided. If she is unemployed she
uses her e¤ort in a backyard informal activity, which yields At; where At is a technolog-
ical parameter, linked to the general economic environment at any time t; which we will
characterize later; if she is employed she earns a wage wt:
Since e¤ort cannot be observed, employed workers can either shirk or work (i.e. choose
an e¤ort level e 2 f0; 1g). An employed shirking worker uses her e¤ort for the backyard
activity earning At in addition to the wage o¤ered by the employer. She can be detected
with probability 1   p and red. In this case, a shirking worker who has been red can
look for a job in the next period by "hiding" among the pool of new workers dN and
her probability of nding a new job is q, where (i) q (which is endogenous and will be
determined later) is the probability, common to all individuals in the unemployment pool,
of being hired and (ii)  2 (0; 1) is a parameter, the probability of being detected by a
new employer as having shirked in the past and accounts for the level of anonymity in the
economy and is known by both workers and employers.
We interpret  as the probability that the news that a worker has shirked in the past
when employed reached a new employer. We assume that employers are committed, perhaps
by customary rules, not to hire the workers if they can observe the signal, and this behavior
is common knowledge among all workers.
The parameter  measures the degree of anonymity in labour markets and we interpret
 as an index of commercialization of the economy, and consider a increase of  as growing
commercialization.3
3Here, we assume that individuals who receive the signal about a shirking worker will not hire him.
Grief shows that this strategy can be a sequential equilibrium when all employers shared information with
each other about the performance of past employed workers do not hire a currently unemployed worker
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A non-shirking worker will work in the rm until termination (which happens with
probability d at each t). We note that p + (1   p)q is the probability that a shirking
worker at time t; will still be alive at time t + 1. We dene V Et (e) as the intertemporal
utility of an employed worker that exercises e¤ort e 2 f0; 1g at time t:
We will now write down the conditions required to ensure that at the prevailing wages
at time period t, choosing high e¤ort e = 1 is optimal for each employed worker. To this
end, by the one-shot deviation principle (Blackwell (1965)), it is su¢ cient to show that no
employed worker can gain by deviating and choosing low e¤ort e = 0 for one period at any
t.
Fix a sequence of market wages fwt : t  0g.
The intertemporal utility for an employed non shirking worker is
V Et (1) = wt + V
E
t+1(1); (1)
and we have the following expected discounted utilities for an employed worker who shirks
once but does not shirk again in the future:
V Et (0) = wt + At + ((p+ (1  p)q)V Et+1(1) + (1  (p+ (1  p)q))V USt+1 ); (2)
where V USt is the intertemporal utility of an unemployed worker who has shirked at least
once in the past but does not shirk again if employed in the future i.e.
V USt = At + (qV
E
t+1(1) + (1  q)V USt+1 ): (3)
Therefore, given the sequence of market wages, the no shirking constraint is met when-
ever:
V Et (1)  V Et (0): (4)
We assume that at each t, each worker correctly anticipates future levels of V Et (e); e 2 f0; 1g
who has shirked when employed in the past so that  = 1 (this scenario corresponds to the organization
of Maghrebi traders described and analyzed as an equilibrium scenario by Grief (1994)). If no employer
shares information with any other employer about the performance of past employed workers, then  = 0
(this scenario corresponds to the organization of Genoese traders described and analyzed as an equilibrium
scenario by Grief (1994). We take  as exogenous and treat as a continuous varaible although we note that
we can adapt Greif (1994) to our setting to generate the extreme values,  = 1 and  = 0, as equilibrium
scenarios.
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and V USt .
3.2 Production and rms
There is a xed mass of one identical rms, indexed by i. We will assume that each
rm has an increasing, strictly concave production function with Harrod-neutral (or labour
augmenting) technological progress F (k;Atl).
To begin with, we assume perfect substitution between factors:
F (k;Atl) = (k + (1  )Atl);  < 1 (5)
We will return to the general case (allowing for imperfect substitutability between the
factors of production) in the next subsection.
We assume that At evolves over time according to
At = (1  )At 1 + a(Kt 1), 0 <  < 1: (6)
The interpretation is that the prevailing technology in any period t is a weighted average of
the technology prevailing in the preceding period and any new knowledge created in that
period. We assume that the new knowledge created in the preceding period is an increasing
function of the aggregate capital stock Kt 1 at t  1. This assumption can be interpreted
as productivity growth through learning by doing (e.g. Arrow (1962) and Romer (1986)),
specically the stock of knowledge increases with the amount of capital used within each
rm i.e. a(0) = 0 and a0(Kt 1) > 0.
Firms borrow capital from an external capital market at an exogenously given interest
rate r; the capital supply is perfectly elastic and, in equilibrium, make non-zero prots,
given the assumption  < 1, which implies decreasing return to scale on capital and labor
factors. Therefore, prots of the rm can be interpreted as a return to a xed factor of
production namely entrepreneurship.
All rms are price-takers. At each t, each rm i takes the interest rate r and the
technological parameter At as given. Although rmschoices at time t   1 inuence the
technology at time t; we make the standard assumption that the contribution of each rm
is negligible and it is not internalized when the decision takes place: in e¤ect, maximizing
the sum of prots over time is equivalent to maximizing current period prots within each
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time period. Therefore, at each t, each rm maximizes current period prots only i.e.
max
wi;t;ki;t;li;t
F (k;Atl)  wi;tli;t   rki;t (7)
3.3 Market equilibria and steady state
We dene a market equilibrium for a xed  as follows:
A market equilibrium is a sequence of (Kt ; L

t ; w

t ; A

t : t  1) such that at each t = 0; 1 : : : :
1. Given r and At , for each rms wi;t = w

t li;t = L

t ; ki;t = K

t maximizes prots,
2. No employed worker shirks i.e. wt satises the no shirking constraint(4),
3. At = A

t 1 + a(K

t 1).
At a steady state Kt = Kt+1 = K, Lt = Lt+1 = L and At = At+1 = A for all t.
From (6), it follows that A = a (K). Therefore, the steady state (long-run) values of the
variables at a market equilibrium are denoted by (K; L; w; A = a(K)).
Next, we characterize the market equilibrium in our model rst for the case of perfect
substitutes and then for the general case with imperfect substitutes.
3.4 Market equilibrium with perfect substitutes
Consider, rst, the prot maximizing problem for each rm (7) with
F (k;Atl) = (k + (1  )Atl);  < 1:
First, note that in equilibrium, for each rm, at each t, at an interior solution the rst
order conditions with respect to capital and labour ki;t and li;t are:
(1  )At(ki;t + (1  )Atli;t) 1 = wt (8)
(ki;t + (1  )Atli;t) 1 = r (9)
we can rewrite (8) as:
ki;t =
 (1  )Atli;t +
 
r

 1
1 

(10)
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and substituting it in (9) we obtain simply
wt = At

1  


r (11)
i.e. at each t, at an interior solution, the factor price ratio wt
r
is equal to the constant
(factors of production are perfect substitutes) slope of the isoquant At
 
1 


.
Let ! =
 
1 


r, so that wt = !At or equivalently, ! =
wt
At
. We interpret ! as wages
measured in e¢ ciency units of labour. In the case with perfect substitutes, as we shall see
below, ! will remain constant over time but as At will evolve over time, real wages wt will
change over time.
With wt = !At, we can decompose the value functions (1), (2) and (3) for each worker
as follows:
V Et (1) = Atv
E
t (1) (12)
V Et (0) = Atv
E
t (0) (13)
V USt = Atv
US
t : (14)
where vEt (e) and v
US
t depend on !. Furthermore, we note that in equilibrium the no shirking
constraint (4) must bind, therefore
vEt (1) = v
E
t (0): (15)
It follows that solving recursively the system given by expressions (14), (13) and (12)
for the steady state values of vEt (1); v
E
t (0) and v
US
t and using the equilibrium condition
(15), we have
! =
(1  p(1  q))
(1  (p+ (1  p)q)) : (16)
We note that for any given q; ! is increasing in - wages in e¢ ciency units are higher
the higher the level of anonymity. Now we can determine the equilibrium labor demand. In
equilibrium nobody shirks, so the probability of nding a job for any non employed worker
is q; and dL is number of new jobs in the economy, at the same time dN is the ow of new
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employed workers, therefore the equation qdN = dL must hold. Let us then dene
q = q(L) =
L
N
; (17)
Using (16) and (17), we can then rewrite the no shirking constraint as
!(L; ) =
 (1  p(1  q(L)))
 (1  (p+ (1  p)q(L)) : (18)
from which we note that, di¤erently from the classical model with "e¢ ciency wages", our
equilibria are compatible with no unemployment N = L  i.e. it is possible that when
q(L) = 1; w <1 for low values of  i.e. when the degree of anonymity in the market isnt
too high.
Moreover,
lim
L!0
!(L; ) =
 (1  p)
 (1  p)  !:
independent of the value for .
Therefore, as long as
 (1  p)
 (1  p) <

1  


r; (19)
there is a positive level of steady state employment L for each value of . Further, as
(1   p(1   q(L))) is increasing in both L and  and (1   (p + (1   p)q(L))) is
decreasing in both L and  so that the ratio (1 p(1 q(L)))
(1 (p+(1 p)q(L))) is increasing in both L and
, an increase in the value of  must lower employment i.e. decrease L.
We depict the impact of a changing value of  in Figure 1 below.
Figure 1 shows how (11) and (18) determine the equilibrium labor demand. The Non
Shirking area is above the upward bending lines, AS and AS, determined by equation
(18). For higher level of  (i.e. higher market anonymity), the line rotates upward, going
from AS to AS. The straight line is the equilibrium wage, characterized by (11). At the
equilibrium, the higher degree of anonymity 0 corresponds to a lower level of employment
L0, as we can see in the gure comparing equilibrium E 0 with equilibrium E.
Intuitively, with an increase in anonymity, rms must o¤er higher wages for a given
level of unemployment. However at a higher wage they would prefer to substitute all
workers with capital: this is obviously not an equilibrium because with such a high level
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Figure 1: Labor market with pefect substititute production factors
of unemployment wages can go down so that rms can reemploy workers until the new
level of unemployment is reached at a wage not higher than before. Therefore, with perfect
substitutability, the only labor market e¤ect of an increase in the degree of anonymity is a
lowering of the level of employment. In the following section, where we relax the assumption
of perfect substitutability, we show that the labor market will be also cleared by an increase
in equilibrium wages. We will now analyze the e¤ect of anonymity on capital allocation,
which will have an impact on productivity in the long-run. Note also that although the
wage in e¢ ciency units ! remains constant, real wages wt will evolve over time as At
changes over time.
Note from (18) that the equilibrium employment L is not dependent on At and Kt; so
that we will write equilibrium employment as a function of the degree of anonymity alone
i.e. L(), with L0() < 0. Using the demand for capital of a single rm, (10) and recalling
that in equilibrium all rms are equal, so that Kt = ki;t and L () = li;t for all rms i at
each t, aggregate capital at each time t is determined by the following equation:
Kt =  (1  )

AtL() +
1

 r

 1
1 
: (20)
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Taken together with (6), (20) determines the evolution of capital and technology over
time. The following proposition characterizes the dynamics for the case where capital and
labour are perfect substitutes:
Proposition 1 Under condition (19), the relationship between anonymity, technology and
capital in the long-run, when capital and labour are perfect substitutes, is given by the
following:
(i)For each , there is a unique steady state with a positive capital stock K = K (),
a positive level of employment L = L(), and technology A = a(K ()) > 0;
(ii) The steady state capital stock K (), technology A = a(K ()) and real wages
w = !a(K ()) are all increasing in the degree of anonymity .
(iii) The steady state is locally a saddle and further, whenever a0 (K) < 
(1 )L() the
steady state is locally stable.
Proof: See the appendix 
The above proposition shows that there is a unique positive steady state value of the
capital stock K corresponding to each value of . If the degree of anonymity increases
to 0 > , what are the short-run and long-run e¤ects? With k and l perfect substitutes,
wages in e¢ ciency units have to be constant and therefore, the labour market clears after
a change in  through a reduction in employment. In turn, a reduction in employment
increases the demand for capital and therefore, results in a bigger capital stock, increased
real wages and a higher level of technology in the long run. Further, as employment levels
for a xed  do not depend on the current capital stock, if technology is not too sensitive
to small change in capital stock, the steady state is locally stable.
In the following section, we relax the assumption of capital and labor being perfect
substitutes and show that the main results will not change. The main di¤erence is that,
after an increase in ; the labor market will perhaps more realistically clear through an
increase of wages in e¢ ciency unit, !:
3.5 Market equilibrium with imperfect substitutes
A key assumption that allowed explicit computation of the equations in the above analysis
was that capital and labour were perfect substitutes in production. In this part of the
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paper, we generalize the dynamics to the case where the factors of production are imperfect
substitutes.
We will assume that the production function F (k;Al) is increasing in both its argu-
ments, is strictly concave and smooth in k and l; that F 00kl(k;Al) < 0 (i .e. the factors of
production are (imperfect) substitutes), and limk!0 Fk = liml!0 Fl =14.
At each t, in equilibrium, the rst order conditions characterizing prot maximizing
input choices are:
Fk(kt; Atlt) = r (21)
AtFl(kt; Atlt) = w

t : (22)
Assume that at each t, wt = !tAt i.e. the market wage is linear in At so that, as
before, we can decompose the value functions for each worker with V Et (1) = Atv
E
t (1),
V Et = Atv
E
t (0) and V
U
t = Atv
U
t where v
E
t (1), v
E
t (1) and v
U
t depend on !t. The interpretation
of !t =
wt
At
is the same as before (i.e. real wage expressed in e¢ ciency units). Recalling
that in equilibrium all rms are equal, so that Kt = ki;t and Lt = li;t for all rms i at each
t, we can determine the aggregate equations describing the steady state (where we have
used (6)) as follows:
Fk(K
; A (K)L) = r (23)
Fl(K
; A (K)L) = !t: (24)
with the no shirking constraint (4)
! = ! (L; ) =
(1  p(1  q(L)))
(1  (p+ (1  p)q(L))) : (25)
where q(L) = L

N
.
What is the impact of a change in the degree of anonymity  on the steady state values
of capital stock, employment and wages?
By examining the impact of a higher degree of anonymity on the steady state capital
4An example of a production function that satises all these assumptions is F (k;Al) = (k + (1  
) (Atl)

)
1
 , 0 <  < 1, 0 <  < 1.
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labour ratio and wages, the following proposition generalizes Proposition 1 to the case
where capital and labour are imperfect substitutes in production:
Proposition 2 Suppose that the production function is concave and satises the assump-
tion that capital and labour are imperfect substitutes i..e. F 00kl(k;Al) < 0. The relationship
between anonymity, technological and the equilibrium capital dynamics when capital and
labour are imperfect substitutes is given by the following:
(i) For each  > 0, there is a unique steady state with positive capital stock K = K ()
and employment level L = L ();
(ii) The steady state stock capital labour ratio K

L =
K()
L()
, technology A = a(K ())
and real wages w = ! (L ()) a(K ()) are all increasing in the degree of anonymity ;
(iii) Assume that in the vicinity of the steady state, at each t, agents expect that future
employment and wage levels will be the same as current employment levels. For each  > 0,
the steady state is locally a saddle. Further, there exists 0 <  < 1 such that whenever
 <  < 1 the steady state is locally stable.
Proof: See the appendix.
The above proposition shows that there is a unique positive steady state value of the
capital stock K corresponding to each value of . If the degree of anonymity increases to
0 > , what are the short-run and long-run e¤ects?
Note that in the previous section, with k and l perfect substitutes, wages in e¢ ciency
units have to be constant and therefore, the labour market clears after a change in  through
a change in employment. Starting from the steady state capital stock and employment
corresponding to , with imperfect substitutes in the model, a change in  results in a
change in (real) wages in the short-term i.e. in a change in !t (as always At is xed at t
and will change from period t+1). In response to an increase in !t, no rm will substitute
labor with capital entirely given that the marginal productivity of capital will decrease, and
the marginal productivity of labour will increase, as more capital is employed. Therefore,
when capital and labour are imperfect substitutes in production, wages in e¢ ciency units
are no longer held constant and both wages in e¢ ciency units and employment will adjust
to clear the labor market.
In the long-run, an increase in the anonymity of the labor market results in a shift to a
more capital intensive production and higher wages in e¢ ciency units and via technological
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progress (driven by learning by doing), the steady state capital and real wages associated
with a higher level of anonymity (and hence, technology) is also an increasing function of
.
In order to examine the local stability of the steady state, we assume that in the vicinity
of the steady state, at each t, agents expect that future employment and wage levels will be
the same as current employment levels. Under this assumption, when workers are patient
enough, current wages in e¢ ciency units arent too sensitive to small changes in current
labour market conditions. Therefore, small changes in current labour market conditions
do not result in large changes in relative factor prices and therefore, capital stock and
technology. Therefore, when workers are patient enough, the steady state is locally stable.
4 Historical evidence: the transition to modern eco-
nomic growth in Northwest Europe, 1300-1850
We now examine the transition to modern economic growth, combining historical evidence
with the theoretical model presented in the previous section. We argue that the Commercial
Revolution of the early modern period was an important staging post on the road to the
Industrial Revolution because of the e¤ects of growing commercialisation on factor prices.
Increasing anonymity due to growing commercialisation led to an increase in the price of
labour relative to the price of capital, which induced a substitution into a more capital
intensive technology and an acceleration of technological progress through learning by
doing. We argue further that the fact that commercialisation went further in Britain than
in the rest of Europe helps to explain why the Industrial Revolution occurred rst in Britain.
4.1 Growing commercialisation
The growing commercialisation of the European economy can most easily be captured
quantitatively in the share of the population living in urban areas, since towns were the
centres of commerce. Table 1 provides data on the share of the population living in towns
of at least 10,000 inhabitants. For Europe as a whole, the trend is unmistakably upwards
from 1400. Looking at regional trends, however, urbanization shows a pattern of divergence
within Europe. In the late medieval period, there were two main urban centres of commerce
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in north Italy and in the Low Countries. While urbanization stalled in north Italy after
1500, there was a brief surge in Portugal and to a lesser extent Spain during the sixteenth
century, following the opening up of the new trade routes to Asia and the New World.
However, the most dramatic growth of urbanization in the early modern period occurred
in the Netherlands in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and in England during the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries as those countries displaced the Iberian powers in long
distance trade and commercialized their domestic economies to an unprecedented extent.
This growth of commercialisation had implications for the degree of anonymity in eco-
nomic relations, in factor markets as well as in product markets and this, in turn, had
implications for wages. When workers were employed in small-scale enterprise in rural lo-
cations where they formed part of a close-knit community, the problem of securing e¤ort
from workers could be solved through reliance on customary relations backed up by close
supervision. As people moved to towns where they were unknown to their neighbors and
potential employers, it became necessary for employers to nd new ways to elicit e¤ort.
In the model above, this is captured by a change in , the degree of anonymity in the
economy, which lies at the heart of the no-shirking constraint equations (18) and (25).
One approach to dealing with this increase in the degree of anonymity in market based
relationships, which was widely adopted in large urban enterprises during the early stages
of the Industrial Revolution, was payment by results or piece rates (Pollard, 1965: 189-191).
Of course, piece rates had also been used in a rural setting during the early modern period
as part of the putting out system, but their discoveryin the context of urban industry in
the eighteenth century was often greeted as an innovation of major signicance(Pollard,
1965: 190). However, as Huberman (1996: 17-32) points out, attempts to manage the
wage-e¤ort bargain through piece rate payments in early nineteenth century Lancashire
often met with little success unless accompanied by the payment of an e¢ ciency wage
above the spot-market rate. Rather than risk the prospect of losing a job with a wage
above the spot market rate, a worker employed at the e¢ ciency wage is deterred from
shirking (Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984).5
5Although the Lancashire market for labour in cotton spinning in the early nineteenth century has
often been portrayed as the archetypal spot market, Huberman (1996) cautions against this interpretation,
arguing that it was more myth than reality. It is, moreover, a myth which is di¢ cult to square with the
central nding that has emerged from the new focus on comparative levels of real wages in Europe: that
Britain was a high wage economy at the time of the Industrial Revolution (Allen, 2001; Broadberry and
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4.2 Changing factor prices
Table 2 sets out the pattern of silver wages in Europe. The silver wage is the silver content of
the money wage in the local currency, and is useful for comparing wages across countries on
a silver standard. Note rst that Northwestern Europe saw substantial silver wage growth
in the century after the Black Death of the mid-fourteenth century and again during the
early modern period after 1500, as well as during the Industrial Revolution period from the
mid-eighteenth century, when Britain nally overtook the Netherlands decisively. Second,
note that although southern Europe shared in the rise in the silver wage following the Black
Death, from the mid fteenth century the region was characterized more by uctuations
than by trend growth in the silver wage. Third, central and eastern Europe were also
characterized more by uctuations than by trend growth in the silver wage from the mid-
fourteenth century. This is the pattern that would be expected from the conventional
economic history of Europe, with the Mediterranean region playing the leading economic
role during the rst half of the millennium, but with northwest Europe forging ahead after
1500.
We have focused so far on wage di¤erences within Europe, but a complete picture of
the transition to modern economic growth also requires a consideration of wage di¤erences
between Europe and Asia. Broadberry and Gupta (2006) provide some evidence of this
Great Divergence in the form of silver wage di¤erences, shown here in Table 3. Silver wages
in India and the Yangzi delta region of China were already lower than those in England
by the beginning of the seventeenth century, and then fell further behind. Contrary to
the revisionist claims of Pomeranz (2000), Parthasarathi (1998) and Frank (1998) that the
richest parts of Asia remained at the same level of development as the richest parts of
Europe until as late as 1800, they appear closer to the poorer parts of Europe.
We are interested in the incentives to adopt capital intensive technology. Hence we need
also to examine the cost of capital, an important element of which is the rate of interest.
Nominal interest rates for a number of countries are presented in Table 4. Note that since
interest rates changed together across Europe, it is reasonable to assume them exogenous
with respect to each single European economy, so that intra-European di¤erences in the
factor price ratio were driven by wage rate changes, as highlighted in our model. Table
Gupta, 2006).
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4 suggests a rate of interest in Europe around 10% in the late medieval period, falling to
5-6% in the aftermath of the Black Death, 1350-1400. There was a further reduction in
European rates of interest during the rst half of the eighteenth century, to around 3-4%.
By this point, interest rates were substantially lower in Europe than in other parts of the
world such as India, where rates remained at medieval levels. Growing commercialisation
was thus accompanied by declining interest rates. The downward trend of interest rates in
Europe, combined with the increase in wages, translates into an increase in the wage/cost
of capital ratio, raising the incentives to substitute capital for labour in production. The
greater increase of wage rates in northwest Europe meant that the incentive to adopt capital
intensive production methods was also greater in that region.
4.3 Factor prices and technology
Recent work by Broadberry and Gupta (2006; 2009) and by Allen (2009) emphasize the
important role of factor prices in explaining the key technological choices of the Industrial
Revolution period. Broadberry and Gupta (2009) analyze the shift of competitive advan-
tage in cotton textiles between India and Britain. India was the worlds major producer
and exporter of cotton textiles during the early modern period, but was displaced from this
position by Britain during the Industrial Revolution. Broadberry and Gupta (2009) point
to the much higher wages in Britain than in India already in the late seventeenth century,
when Indian cotton textiles were imported into Britain by the East India Company. This
can be seen in the rst column of Table 5. Combined with the smaller di¤erences in the cost
of raw cotton and the cost of capital, this presented British producers with a severe total
factor input (TFI) price disadvantage. To get to a point where the free on board price was
cheaper in Britain, required a shift to more capital intensive technology and a sustained
period of technological progress to increase total factor productivity (TFP). For much of
the eighteenth century, the edgling British cotton industry required protection, although
the point at which the shift in competitive advantage from India to Britain occurred varied
by type of yarn or cloth (as a result of di¤erent input costs) and by market (as a result of
transport costs).
Once the shift to capital-intensive technology had occurred, technological progress ac-
celerated, as implied by equation (6) in the model. In Table 5, TFP growth shifted in
Britains favour at an annual rate of 0.3 per cent before 1770, rising to 1.5 per cent during
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the period 1770-1820. This would be quite consistent with the 1.9 per cent per annum TFP
growth rate estimated by Harley (1993: 200) for the British cotton industry between 1780
and 1860, together with slowly rising or stagnating productivity in India. This acceleration
of TFP growth following the shift to capital intensive technology can be explained by the
greater potential for learning on capital intensive technology.
4.4 Real economic development
In Table 2, we examined the path of silver wages. However, an analysis of the transition to
modern economic growth would not be complete without considering the path of real con-
sumption wages and GDP per capita. The real consumption wage is obtained by dividing
the silver wage with the silver price of basic consumption goods. Real consumption wages
of European unskilled building labourers for the period 1300-1850 are shown in Table 6,
taking London in the period 1500-49 as the numeraire. The rst point to note is that real
wages followed a similar pattern across the Black Death in the whole of Europe. Complete
time series exist for comparatively few cities before 1500, but there is also scattered evidence
for other cities. Taken together, the evidence supports the idea of a substantial rise in the
real wage across the whole continent of Europe following the Black Death, which struck in
the middle of the fourteenth century, wiping out between a third and a half of the popula-
tion, when successive waves of the plague are cumulated (Herlihy, 1997). This episode of
European economic history is thus broadly consistent with the Malthusian model, with a
strong negative relationship between real wages and population (Postan, 1972: 27-40). In
the rst half of the fteenth century, the real wage was quite uniform across the countries
for which we have data, at about twice its pre-Black Death level. From the second half
of the fteenth century, however, Britain and Holland followed a very di¤erent path from
the rest of Europe, maintaining real wages at the post-Black Death level and avoiding the
collapse of real wages which occurred on the rest of the continent as population growth
returned. Considering that in the same period Britain and Holland witnessed an increase
in the level of urbanization, as noted above, we can argue that the anonymity is a candidate
to explain this emergence of high wages in northwest Europe.
Table 7 presents the results of the latest research on the reconstruction of national in-
come during the late medieval and early modern periods in a number of countries. The
GDP per capita data show northwest Europe pulling ahead of the previously more de-
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veloped Mediterranean Europe from the late sixteenth century. The national income data
thus reinforce the conclusion from the silver wage and real wage data and from urbanization
rates that Britain and Holland followed a di¤erent path from Italy and Spain. The Indian
data conrm the conventional view that the Great Divergence was already underway during
the early modern period, as Europe embarked upon a period of growing commercialisation
which would ultimately end up with the Industrial Revolution and the transition to modern
economic growth.
4.5 A simple econometric test
Our hypothesis is that commercialization led to high wages throughout Europe, in the
short-run through the e¢ ciency wage channel (increasing !t), and in the longer term be-
cause of the improved technology At. So far we have reviewed evidence showing that the
urbanizationthat we consider as a proxy for commercialization, wage rate and GDP per
capita data are related in a way which is at least consistent with the direction of causal-
ity proposed in the model. In what follows, we will estimate a simple econometric model
linking real wages and urbanization.
There are at least two main problems in establishing causality from urbanization to
wages: (i) a possible omitted variable bias since wages and urbanization can both be a
by-product of underlying economic trends e.g. cycles or technological improvements, or
other shocks; (ii) a possible problem of endogeneity., given that urbanization can be the
e¤ect rather than the cause of higher wages.
Given the constraints of available data, we will address (i) by controlling for country
GDP and introducing the year xed e¤ect in the regressors, and (ii) by instrumenting
urbanization at time t, with urbanization 50 years before.
Therefore, we estimate the following equation:
wagei;t = ci +   gdpi;t:+   urbanizationi;t + yeart + "i;t; (26)
where index i indicates the city, and t indexes time.
Data on wages are aggregated at city level and are taken from table 2, while data on
urbanization; aggregated at country level, are from table 1. The variable gdp is the per
capita gross domestic product displayed in table 7, as we said this provides a control for
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the idiosyncratic economic cycles and technology, the years dummies yeart control for the
e¤ects generated by common shocks. Dummy variable ci controls for city xed e¤ects.
Table 8 displays the results of the estimations. Column 1 shows the above described
pattern between wages and urbanization, column 2 shows that this relation is still signicant
when we control for the aggregate shocks by introducing the year e¤ect. In column 3 we
introduce country GDP to control for some country level omitted variable. In column 4
we use a two stage least squares estimator by using urbanizationt 1 (therefore 50 years
before) as an instrument for urbanizationt: Finally in column 5 we introduce the wages at
time t  1 in the 2SLS estimation to control for the e¤ect of wagesserial correlations. In
all specications and consistently with our model, the coe¢ cient of urbanization is positive
and highly signicant.
5 Concluding comments
We have argued that commercialisation played a pivotal role in the transition to modern
economic growth. We see the growing commercialisation of the late medieval and early
modern periods as leading to the acceleration of technological progress during the Industrial
Revolution period via its e¤ects on factor prices. The argument can be summarized as
follows: (1) Commercialisation raised wages as a growing reliance on impersonal labour
market relations in place of customary relations with a high degree of monitoring led to
the adoption of e¢ ciency wages. (2) The resulting rise in the wage/cost of capital ratio led
to the adoption of a more capital-intensive production technology. (3) This led to a faster
rate of technological progress through greater learning by doing on the capital intensive
technology.
References
[1] Acemoglu, D. (2009) When Does Labor Scarcity Encourage Innovation? NBERWork-
ing Paper No. 14809
[2] Acemoglu D. and J A. Robinson,(2006), Economic Origins of. Dictatorship and Democ-
racy. New York: Cambridge University. Press, 2006.
22
[3] Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S. and J.A. Robinson, (2005), The Rise of Europe: Atlantic
Trade, Institutional Change and Economic Growth, American Economic Review,
95: 546-579.
[4] Allen, R.C. (2001), The Great Divergence in European Wages and Prices from the
Middle Ages to the First World War, Explorations in Economic History, 38, 411-
447.
[5] Allen, R.C. (2009), The British Industrial Revolution in Global Perspective, Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press.
[6] Álvarez-Nogal, C. and Prados de la Escosura, L. (2009), The Rise and Fall of Spain,
800-1850, Universidad Carlos III, Madrid.
[7] Arrow, K.J. (1962), The Economic Implications of Learning by Doing, Review of
Economic Studies, 29, 155-173.
[8] Banerjee A.V., and A.F. Newman (1998). Information, the Dual Economy, and De-
velopment,Review of Economic Studies 64, 631-653.
[9] Blackwell, D. (1965), Discounted Dynamic Programming,Annals of Mathematical
Statistics 36, 226235.
[10] Álvarez-Nogal, C. and Prados de la Escosura, L. (2009), The Rise and Fall of Spain,
800-1850, Universidad Carlos III, Madrid.
[11] Britnell, R.H. and Campbell, B.M.S. (eds.), (1995), A Commercialising Economy:
England 1086 to c.1300, Manchester: Manchester University Press.
[12] Broadberry, S.N. (1997), The Productivity Race: British Manufacturing in Interna-
tional Perspective, 1850-1990, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
[13] Broadberry, S.N., Campbell, B., Klein, A, Overton, M. and B. van Leeuwen, (2011),
British Economic Growth, 1270-1870, London School of Economics.
[14] Broadberry, S.N. and B. Gupta, (2006), The Early Modern Great Divergence: Wages,
Prices and Economic Development in Europe and Asia, 1500-1800, Economic
History Review, 59, 2-31.
[15] Broadberry, S.N. and B. Gupta. (2009), Lancashire, India and Shifting Competitive
Advantage in Cotton Textiles, 1700-1850: The Neglected Role of Factor Prices,
Economic History Review, (forthcoming),
23
[16] Broadberry, S.N. and B. Gupta, (2011), India and the great Divergence: An Anglo-
Indian Comparison of GDP per capita, 1600-1871, London School of Economics
and University of Warwick.
[17] Buyst, E. (2009), Estimates of Economic Growth in the Southern Low Coun-
tries/Belgium, c.1770-1846, Centre for Economic Studies, Katholieke Universiteit
Leuven.
[18] Cervellati, M. and U. Sunde, (2005),. Human capital formation, life expectancy, and
the process of development. American Economic Review, 95(5), 1653-1672.
[19] Clark, G. (1988), The Cost of Capital and medieval Agricultural technique, Explo-
rations in Economic History, 25, 265-294.
[20] David, P.A. (1975), Technical Choice, Innovation and Economic Growth, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
[21] Doepke, Matthias, (2004), Accounting for Fertility Decline During the Transition to
Growth, Journal of Economic Growth, 9(3):347-383.
[22] Frank, A.G. (1998), ReOrient: The Silver Age in Asia and the World Economy, Berke-
ley: University of California Press.
[23] Fremdling, R. (2000), Transfer Patterns of British Technology to the Continent: The
Case of the Iron Industry, European Review of Economic History, 4, 195-222.
[24] Galor, O. (2005). From stagnation to growth: Unied growth theory. In: P. Aghion
and S. Durlauf (eds), Handbook of economic growth, Vol. 1A. Amsterdam: North-
Holland.
[25] Galor, O., Moav, O. (2000). Ability biased technological transition, wage inequality
and growth·, Quarterly Journal of Economics 115, 469-498.
[26] Galor, O., and Moav, O. (2004). "From physical to human capital accumulation: In-
equality and the process of development". Review of Economic Studies, 71, 1001-
1026.
[27] Galor, O., Moav, O and D, Vollrath (2009) "Inequality in Landownership, the Emer-
gence of Human-Capital Promoting Institutions, and the Great Divergence," Re-
view of Economic Studies, 2009, 76, pp. 143-179
24
[28] Galor, O. and A. Mountford (2006). Trade and the Great Divergence: The Family
connection, American Economic Review 96, 299-303.
[29] Galor, Oded and David Weil, (1999),."From Malthusian Stagnation to Modern
Growth", American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, 89(2):150-154.
[30] Galor, O., andWeil, D. (2000). "Population, technology and growth: From the malthu-
sian regime to the demographic transition and beyond". American Economic Re-
view, 90, 806-828.
[31] Greif, A. (1994), Cultural Beliefs and the Organization of Society: A Historical and
Theoretical Reection on Collectivist and Individualist Societies, Journal of Po-
litical Economy, 102, 912-950.
[32] Greif, A. (2006) "Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy, Lessons from
Medieval Trade". New York, Cambridge University Press.
[33] Habakkuk, H.J. (1962), American and British Technology in the Nineteenth Century,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
[34] Hansen,G.D.,and Prescott, E. (2002). "Malthus to solow. American Economic Re-
view", 92(4), 1205-1217.
[35] Harley, C.K. (1993), Reassessing the Industrial Revolution: A Macro View, in
Mokyr, J. (ed.), The British Industrial Revolution: An Economic Perspective,
Boulder, Colorado: Westview, 171-226.
[36] Herlihy, D. (1997), The Black Death and the Transformation of the West, Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press.
[37] Hicks, J.R. (1932), The Theory of Wages, London: Macmillan.
[38] Huberman, M. (1996), Escape from the Market: Negotiating Work in Lancashire,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
[39] Maddison, A. (2003), The World Economy: Historical Statistics, Paris: Organisation
for Economic Co-operation and Development.
[40] Madsen, J. B. Ang J. B. and R. Banerjee (2010), "Four centuries of British economic
growth: the roles of technology and population", Journal of Economic Growth,
Volume 15, Number 4, Pages 263-290
25
[41] Malanima, P. (2009), Pre-Modern European Economy: One Thousand Years (10th -
19th Centuries, Leiden: Brill.
[42] Malanima, P. (2011), The Long Decline of a Leading Economy: GDP in Central and
Northern Italy, 1300-1913, European Review of Economic History, (forthcoming).
[43] Moosvi, S. (2001), The Indian Experience 1600-1900: A Quantitative Study, in
Panikkar, K.N., Byres, T.J. and Patnaik, U. (eds.), The Making of History: Essays
Presented to Irfan Habib, New Delhi: Tulika, 328-358.
[44] North, D.C. (1990), Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
[45] Pamuk, S. (2007), The Black Death and the Origins of the Great Divergenceacross
Europe, 1300-1600, European Review of Economic History, 11, 289-317.
[46] Parthasarathi, P. (1998), Rethinking Wages and Competitiveness in the Eighteenth
Century: Britain and South India, Past and Present, 158, 79-109.
[47] Pster, U. (2009), German Economic Growth, 1500-1850, Historisches Seminar,
Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität Münster.
[48] Polanyi, K. [1944] (1957), The Great Transformation, London: Bacon Hill.
[49] Pollard, S. (1965), The Genesis of Modern Management: A Study of the Industrial
Revolution in Great Britain, London: Arnold.
[50] Pomeranz, K. (2000), The Great Divergence: China, Europe, and the Making of the
Modern World Economy, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
[51] Postan, M. (1972), The Medieval Economy and Society: An Economic History of
Britain in the Middle Ages, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson.
[52] Romer, Paul M. (1986): Increasing Returns and long-run Growth,Journal of Polit-
ical Economy, 94, 100237.
[53] Rothbarth, E. (1946), Causes of the Superior E¢ ciency of USA Industry as Compared
with British Industry, Economic Journal, 56, 383-390.
[54] Shapiro, C. and Stiglitz, J.E. (1984), Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Disci-
pline Device, American Economic Review, 74, 433-444.
[55] Toynbee, A. (1890), Lectures on the Industrial Revolution of the 18th Century in
England, (third edition), London: Longmans, Green.
26
[56] van Zanden, J.L. (1999), Wages and the Standard of Living in Europe, 1500-1800,
European Review of Economic History, 3, 175-97.
[57] van Zanden, J.L. and van Leeuwen, B. (2011), The Origins of Modern Economic
Growth? Holland between 1347 and 1807, Utrecht University.
[58] Voigtländer, N. and Voth, H.-J. (2010), How the West InventedFertility Restric-
tion, UPF Barcelona.
[59] Vollrtah, D, (2011) "The Agricultural Basis of Comparative Development," Journal of
Economic Growth, 16(4), pp. 343-370
[60] Zeira, J., Workers, machines, and economic growth, Quarterly Journal of Economics,
113 (1998), pp.1091-1117.
27
TABLE 1: European urbanization rates (%)
1300 1400 1500 1600 1700 1750 1800 1870
Northwestern Europe
Scandinavia   0.7 2.1 4.3 4.6 4.6 5.5
England (Wales) 4.0 2.5 2.3 6.0 13.2 16.4 22.1 43.0
Scotland   2.3 1.5 5.3 11.5 23.9 36.3
Ireland 0.8 2.1  1.0 5.1 5.1 7.3 14.2
Netherlands   17.1 29.5 32.5 29.6 28.6 29.1
Belgium 18.2 21.9 17.6 15.1 20.2 16.5 16.6 25.0
France 5.2 4.7 5.0 6.3 8.7 8.7 8.9 18.1
Southern Europe
Italy CN 18 12.4 16.4 14.4 13 13.6 14.2 13.4
Italy SI 9.4 3.3 12.7 18.6 16.1 19.4 21 26.4
Spain 12.1 10.2 11.4 14.5 9.6 9.1 14.7 16.4
Portugal 3.6 4.1 4.8 11.4 9.5 7.5 7.8 10.9
Central-Eastern Europe
Switzerland 3.0 2.0 2.8 2.7 3.3 4.6 3.7 8.2
Austria (Czech, Hung) 0.6 0.5 0.8 1.6 1.7 2.6 3.1 7.7
Germany 3.4 3.9 5.0 4.4 5.4 5.7 6.1 17.0
Poland 1.0 1.3 5.4 6.6 3.8 3.4 4.1 7.8
Balkans 5.2 4.6 7.7 13.3 14 12.3 9.8 10.6
Russia (European) 2.1 2.3 2.0 2.2 2.1 2.5 3.6 6.7
EUROPE 5.4 4.3 5.6 7.3 8.2 8.0 8.8 15.0
Source: Paolo Malanima (2009).
The urbanization rate is dened as the proportion of the population living in sett-
lements of at least 10,000.
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TABLE 2: Daily silver wages of European unskilled building laborers
(grams of silver per day)
1300 1350 1400 1450 1500 1550 1600 1650 1700 1750 1800
Northwestern Europe
London 2.9 3.4 4.5 3.8 3.2 4.6 7.1 9.7 10.5 11.5 17.7
Amsterdam 3.1 4.7 7.2 8.5 8.9 9.2 9.2
Antwerp 3.5 3.1 3.0 5.9 7.6 7.1 6.9 6.9 7.7
Paris 2.8 5.5 6.6 6.9 5.1 5.2 9.9
Southern Europe
Valencia 5.6 5.2 4.2 6.6 8.8 6.9 5.7 5.1 
Madrid  6.3 8.0  5.1 5.3 8.0
Florence/Milan 2.2 4.5 3.8 3.5 2.9 3.8 4.7 4.1 3.2 2.9 3.1
Naples 3.3 3.5 5.3 4.8 4.8 3.8 3.8
Central-Eastern Europe
Gdansk 2.1 2.1 3.8 4.3 3.8 3.7 4.8
Warsaw  2.5 3.2 2.7 1.9 3.4 4.9
Krakow 2.7 2.1 1.9 2.9 3.4 2.9 2.2 2.9 2.4
Vienna 4.0 3.2 2.7 2.6 4.4 3.5 3.2 3 2.1
Leipzig  1.9 3.5 3.9 3.7 3.1 4.4
Augsburg 2.1 3.1 4.0 4.7 4.2 4.3 
Source: Broadberry and Gupta (2006: 7).
Derived from the database underlying Allen (2001: 429).
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TABLE 3: Silver wages of unskilled labourers
(grams of silver per day)
A. Silver wages in England and India
Date England India India/England
1550-99 3.4 0.7 0.21
1600-49 4.1 1.1 0.27
1650-99 5.6 1.4 0.25
1700-49 7.0 1.5 0.21
1750-99 8.3 1.2 0.14
1800-49 14.6 1.8 0.12
B. Silver wages in England and China
Date England China China/England
1550-1649 3.8 1.5 0.39
1750-1849 11.5 1.7 0.15
Source : Broadberry and Gupta (2006)
TABLE 4: Interest rates (% per annum)
England Flanders France Italy Germany India
1201-1250 10.3 10.8 8.6
1251-1300 10.2 10 11.1 10.6 10.8
1301-1350 11.2 12.9 10.1
1351-1400 4.5 8.1 9.7
1401-1450 9.6 8.5
1451-1500 4.0 6.4 9.2 7.6 6.5
1501-1550 4.6 8.2 5.3
1551-1600 6.0 4.3 8.3
1601-1650 6.0 3.9 6.6
1651-1700 5.3 4.4 8
1701-1750 4.3 3.8 4.2 10
1751-1800 4.0 2.7 4.8 4.7 12
Source: Clark (1988: 273-274); Moosvi (2001: 337-9, 342, 351-2).
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TABLE 5: Comparative GB/India costs and prices (India =100)
A. Cost
Wage Raw Cotton P Cost of Capital TFI Price
W/W* C/C* R/R*
c.1680 400 182 137 206
c.1770 460 320 113 270
c.1790 663 480 106 357
c.1820 517 127 61 150
B. Prices and TFP
TFI price FOB TFP
Price P/P* A/A*
c.1680 206 200 103
c.1770 270 200 135
c.1790 357 147 243
c.1820 150 53 283
Source: Broadberry and Gupta (2009).
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TABLE 6: Daily real consumption wages of European unskilled
building labourers (London 1500-49 = 100)
1300 1350 1400 1450 1500 1550 1600 1650 1700 1750 1800
Northwestern Europe
London 57 75 107 113 100 85 80 96 110 99 98
Amsterdam 97 74 92 98 107 98 79
Antwerp 101 109 98 88 93 88 92 88 82
Paris 62 60 59 60 56 51 65
Southern Europe
Valencia 108 103 79 63 62 53 51 41
Madrid 56 51 58 42
Florence/Milan 44 87 107 77 62 53 57 51 47 35 26
Naples 73 54 69 88 50 33
Central-Eastern Europe
Gdansk 78 50 69 72 73 61 40
Warsaw 75 66 72 45 64 82
Krakow 92 73 67 74 65 67 58 63 40
Vienna 115 101 88 60 61 63 61 50 27
Leipzig 34 35 57 53 44 53
Augsburg 62 50 39 63 55 50
Source: Broadberry and Gupta (2006: 7);
derived from the database underlying Allen (2001: 429).
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TABLE 7: GDP per capita levels (in 1990 international dollars)
1250 1300 1350 1400 1450 1500 1550 1600 1650 1700 1750 1800 1850
Northwestern Europe
England 737 730 767 1095 1172 1164 1138 1144 1215 1649 1688 2085 3006
Holland 876 1195 1373 1454 1432 2662 2691 2105 2355 2408 1886
Belgium 929 1089 1073 1203 1264 1357 1497
France 727 841 986 1230
Southern Europe
Spain 1249 1249 1388 1145 1160 1160 1294 1219 1175 1145 1190 1249 1487
Italy 1482 1376 1601 1668 1403 1337 1244 1271 1350 1403 1244 1350
Central-Eastern Europe
Germany 1332 894 1130 1068 1162 1140 1428
Poland 462 516 566 636
Austria 707 837 993 1218
India 684 648 630 587 576 560
Source: Netherlands: van Zanden and van Leeuwen (2011); France, Austria, Poland: Maddison (2005),
England: Broadberry et al. (2011).
Italy: Malanima (2011); Belgium: Buyst (2009), Blomme and van der Wee (1994); Germany: Pster (2009);
Spain: Álvarez-Nogal and Prados de la Escosura (2009); India: Broadberry and Gupta (2011).
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Table 8: E¤ect of Urbanization on Wages: Independent Variable is wage in the main
europen cities. In columns 4 and 5, urbanization is instrumented by using urbanization 50
years before. (std errors in brackets)
OLS OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS
(1) 1300-1800 (2) 1300-1800 (3) 1300-1800 (4) 1300-1800 (5) 1300-1800
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
Urbanization 0.459*** 0.360*** 0.318*** 0.649*** 0.658***
(0.061) (0.056) (0.073) (0.158) (0.195)
GDP 0.002* 0.005*** 0.004
(0.001) (0.002) (0.004)
Wage[t-1] 0.226
(1.065)
Year e¤ects No Yes Yes Yes Yes
City e¤ects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 74 74 66 20 20
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A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1:
(i) It follows from (6) and (20) that the steady state level of capital stock K must be the
solution to the equation
K = f(K) (27)
where f(K) =   (1 )

a(K)L() + 1

 
r

 1
1  . The LHS of (27) is increasing in K while
f 0(K) =   (1 )

a0(K)L() < 0 as a0(K) > 0. Moreover, limK!0 f(K) = 1
 
r

 1
1  > 0.
Therefore, there exists a unique positive steady state capital stock K and technology
a(K).
(ii) The steady state capital stock satises the equation
K =  (1  )

a(K)L() +
1

 r

 1
1 
By taking the total derivative of the preceding equation with respect toK and  we obtain
that
dK
d
=  
(1 )

a(K)L0()
1 + (1 )

a0(K)L()
> 0
as L0() < 0 (from (18)) and a0(K) > 0 (by assumption).
(iii) Examining the local stability of the steady state requires us to linearize the equa-
tions (6) and (20) at the steady state to obtain24 1   (1 ) L()
0 1
3524 dKt
dAt
35 =
24 0 0
a0(K) 1  
3524 dKt 1
dAt 1
35
so that 24 dKt
dAt
35 =
24 1 (1 ) L()
0 1
3524 0 0
a0(K) 1  
3524 dKt 1
dAt 1
35
which after further simplication yields24 dKt
dAt
35 =
24 (1 ) L()a0(K) (1  ) (1 ) L()
a0(K)0 1  
3524 dKt 1
dAt 1
35 :
35
By computation, it is easily checked that the determinant of the matrix on the RHS of
the preceding equation is zero so that if 1 and 2 denote the two eigenvalues of the said
matrix,
12 = 0;
1 + 2 =
(1  )

L()a0(K) + (1  )
so that the steady state is always a saddle and is a sink if (1 )

L()a0(K) + (1  ) < 1
or equivalently, a0(K) < 
(1 )L() .
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2:
(i) We rst show that there is a unique positive steady state capital stock K and that
employment level L exists. Note that the steady state is a solution to the equations:
Fk(K; a (K)L) = r;
Fl(K;A (K)L) = ! (L; ) :
Consider the equation Fk(K; a (K)L) = r. Under the assumption that Fkk < 0, Fll < 0,
Fkl < 0, a0 (K) > 0 from the equation Fk(K; a (K)L) = r there exists an implicit function
g1(L) = K with
g01(L) =  
a(K)Fkl
Fkk + Fkla0 (K)
< 0
while from the equation Fl(K; a (K)L) = ! (L; ) there exists an implicit function g2(L) =
K with
g02(L) =  
a(K)Fll + !l (L; )
Fkk + Fkla0(K)
< 0:
Steady state employment L is the solution to g3(L) = g2(L)  g1(L) = 0. As limk!0 Fk =
liml!0 Fl = 1, limL!0 g3(L) = 1 while limL!1 g3(L) = 0 so that there exists L =
L () > 0 such that g3(L) = g2(L)   g1(L) = 0. Finally, note that K = K () =
g2(L
) = g1(L) > 0.
(ii) We examine how the steady state values of the key endogenously determined vari-
ables change due to changes in . After substituting for wages using the no shirking
constraint (4) and noting that at the steady state A(K) = a (K), the total derivative of
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(23) and (24) at the steady state is given by the expression24 F kk + F kla0(K) F kla(K)
F kl + F

lla
0(K) F lla(K
)  !l
3524 dK
dL
35 =
24 0
!
35 d
where ! = ! (L
; ). The determinant, D0, of the preceding matrix can be written as
D0 =   (F kk + F kla0(K))!l + a(K)
 
F kkF

ll   (F kl)2

> 0
as F (:) is strictly concave, F kl < 0, a
0(K) > 0 and !l > 0. Therefore,24 dK
dL
35 = 1
D0
24 F lla(K)  !l  F kla(K)
 F kl + F lla0(K) F kk + F kla0(K)
3524 0
!
35 d
so that 24 dK
dL
35 = 1
D0
24  F kla(K)!
(F kk + F

kla
0(K))!
35 d
and
dK
d
=  F

kla(K
)!
D0
> 0
dL
d
=
(F kk + F

kla
0(K))!
D0
< 0
as, from (25), ! > 0.
(iii) In order to characterize the local stability of the steady state, we need to characterize
how real wages wt change in the vicinity of the steady state as equilibrium employment Lt
changes.
Consider the scenario described by (1), (2), (3) and the no shirking constraint (4). As
the no shirking constraint (4) holds as an equality in equilibrium, setting vEt (1) = v
E
t (0)
and equating the RHS of (1) and (2) we obtain that at each t,
vEt+1(0) =

 (1  (p+ (1  p)qt)) + v
US
t+1:
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Substituting for vEt+1(0) in (2) we obtain that at each t
vUSt =
 (1  p (1  qt))
(1  (p+ (1  p)qt)) + v
US
t+1
which yields that at each t,
vUSt =
X
t0t
t
0 t

 (1  p (1  qt))
(1  (p+ (1  p)qt))

and therefore,
vEt (0) =

 (1  (p+ (1  p)qt 1)) +
X
t0t
t
0 t

 (1  p (1  qt))
(1  (p+ (1  p)qt))

:
Further, by computation, from (1) we obtain that at each t,
vEt (1) =
1X
t0t
t
0 t!t:
Equating vEt (0) and v
E
t (1) in the vicinity of the steady state and equating the two as
required by the no shirking constraint (4) we obtain that at each t,
1X
t0t
t
0 t!t =

 (1  (p+ (1  p)qt 1)) +
X
t0t
t
0 t

 (1  p (1  qt0))
(1  (p+ (1  p)qt0))

:
At this point, we will assume that in the vicinity of the steady state, at each t, agents
expect that future employment and wage levels will be the same as current employment
levels so that Let0 = Lt and !
e
t0 = !tfor all t
0  t where the superscript e denotes the expected
level of future employment and future wages. In other words, in order to characterize the
dynamics in the vicinity of the steady state,we do not assume that agents have rational
expectations.
Under this assumption, it follows that we can write at each t,
!t =
 (1  )
 (1  (p+ (1  p)qt 1)) +

 (1  p (1  qt))
(1  (p+ (1  p)qt))

:
so that at each t in the vicinity of the steady state d!t = gl dLt 1 + f

l dLt where f
 =
(1 p(1 q(LN )))
(1 (p+(1 p)q(LN )))
and g = (1 )
(1 (p+(1 p)q(LN )))
.
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Taking the above computation into account and noting that at the steady state A(K) =
a (K), examining the local stability of the steady state requires us to linearize the equations
(6), (23) and (24) at the steady state to obtain
2664
F kk a(K
)F kl 0
F kl a(K
)F ll   f l 0
0 0 1
3775
2664
dKt
dLt
dAt
3775 =
2664
0 0 0
0 gl 0
a0(K) 0 1  
3775
2664
dKt 1
dLt 1
dAt 1
3775
where F ij = Fij(K
; a (K)L), i; j = k; l and !l = !l (L
; ).
The matrix on the LHS of the preceding equation is invertible. Its determinant, D, is
D =  F kk!l + a(K)

F kkF

ll   (F kl)2

> 0
by strict concavity of the production function, F kk < 0 and

F kkF

ll   (F kl)2

> 0 and as
!l < 0.
It follows that 2664
dKt
dLt
dAt
3775 = 1D
2664
a(K)F ll   !l  a(K)F kl 0
 F kl F kk 0
0 0 D
3775
2664
0 0 0
0 gl 0
a0(K) 0 1  
3775
2664
dKt 1
dLt 1
dAt 1
3775
so that 2664
dKt
dLt
dAt
3775 =
2664
0 0 0
0 F kkg

l 0
a0(K) 0 1  
3775
2664
dKt 1
dLt 1
dAt 1
3775
By computation, the eigenvalues of the matrix on the RHS of the preceding equation must
satisfy the equation 1 (2   F kkgl ) (3   (1  )) = 0 so that it immediately follows that
two eigenvalues always have a modulus strictly less than one so that the steady state is
locally a saddle and whenever jF kkgl j =
 F kkq0(LN )(1 )N(1 (p+(1 p)q))  < 1 a sink. Clearly, if  is close
enough to one,
 F kkq0(LN )(1 )N(1 (p+(1 p)q))  < 1.
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